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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF U FAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
RAYMOND DEAN McARTHUR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20030380-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDIC I ION ^ ND NATUR1 OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction .» • •• * ....*.,.
 IU , ^ o r using a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, ; class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-506 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederic^ - w> This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant's i l.uiu (ails because he asserts no plain error in the district 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw, which is the only order from which he has a right 
to appeal. 
This question does i lot i equii e tl lis Court to review any ruling or failure to rule by the 
district court; accordingly, no standard of review applies. 
2, Whether omitting speedy and impartial from the plea colloquy constituted obvious 
and prejudicial error, where they are included in the Statement of Defendant, which 
defendant read, discussed with counsel, and understood. 
Defendant proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard." State v. Labmm, 881 
P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (1996). To 
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error was 
obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
3. Whether defendant's and his counsel's certification that he "twice exhibited a knife 
in a threatening manner in the presence of two persons" is a sufficient factual basis to support 
the guilty plea. 
Defendant again proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard," which requires him 
to show obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to this appeal. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
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(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
nght against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the nght to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the nght to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these nghts are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements ot the ottense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements, 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged cnme was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be 
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result ot a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the nght of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Raymond Dean McArthur—also known as Raymond McKenna, Randall Peterson, and 
Trent Peterson—was charged by Domestic Violence Information dated 29 October 2002 w ith 
two third degree felonies and four misdemeanors: 
Count I Aggravated assault (domestic violence), a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) and 77-36-1 (1999); 
Count II Aggravated assault (domestic violence), a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) and 77-36-1 (1999); 
Count III Assault, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102 (Supp. 2002); 
Count IV Interference with a peace officer making an arrest, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999); 
Count V Commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class 
B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(c)(i) 
(Supp. 2002); 
Count VI Intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-9-701(1) (1999). 
R. 3-6. A warrant was issued for his arrest. R. 1. Defendant was bound over on all counts 
except count IV. R. 91: 45. 
Defendant pled guilty to two reduced counts of threatening with or using a dangerous 
weapon in a fight or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 
(1999), and the remaining counts were dismissed. R. 45-46. The court reduced defendant's 
bail, ordered defendant to have no contact with the victims, and ordered a presentence 
investigation report. R. 45-47. 
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On 21 February 2003, defendant was sentenced to one year in jail on each count, to run 
consecutively. R. 50-51. He was also ordered "not to contact victim(s) in any way." R. 51. 
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he had "been informed 
by third parties that his mother, if called to testify in court in this matter, would provide 
testimony which was favorable to him and which would not support the state's theory that 
he committed two counts of Aggravated Assault." R. 54. 
Defendant did not testify at the motion hearing. See R. 87. The court denied the 
motion, noting that "the mother's statement in the pre-sentence report was to the effect that 
she was afraid of this man, that she couldn't deal with him anymore, and she feared him to 
the point that she was afraid to even make a statement in the pre-sentence report." R. 67-69; 
R. 87: 4-5. Defendant timely appealed. R. 70. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant terrorizes his mother, sister, daughter, and granddaughter 
In October of 2002, defendant was babysitting for his daughter, Sherile Fernandez. R. 
91: 5-6. At about 11:30 p.m., Sherile took defendant back to his home. R. 91: 6-7, 11. 
Sherile's five-year-old daughter Monica was in the back seat, on the driver's side. R. 91: 7. 
Sherile smelled alcohol on defendant and asked him how much he had drunk; he pulled 
out a 40-ounce bottle of "Wyoming beer" and said, "Two of these." R. 91: 12. 
They drove to defendant's mother's home and parked in the driveway. R. 91: 8. 
Sherile and defendant began to argue. R.91:7,13-14. He wanted to take Monica overnight, 
1
 This fact statement is based on facts presented in the preliminary hearing. Judge 
William W. Barrett presided at the preliminary hearing. R. 92: 91. 
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but Sherile noticed he had been drinking and did not want to leave her daughter with him. 
R. 91: 7. When Sherile told defendant he couldn't take Monica, he "got very belligerent and 
rude," calling her names and saying "bad things" about her. R. 91: 8. Sherile told him to get 
out of the car, but he refused. R. 91: 8. 
Sherile moved away from defendant "because he was drunk and [she] didn't know what 
he was capable of doing." R. 91: 14. Defendant also hit Sherile three times in the head with 
a closed fist, while Sherile tried to "block the punches." R. 91: 8, 15. Her head hurt for two 
weeks. R. 91: 8. Defendant then got out of the car and went around to Monica's door. R. 
91:9. Sherilejumped out and told him to get away from her daughter. R. 91:9. She did not 
want him to open the door. R. 91: 9. Defendant grabbed her and threw her to the ground. 
R. 91: 9,16. Because defendant had a 40-ounce glass bottle in his hand, and Sherile thought 
he might throw it at her, she "curled up in a ball." R. 91: 9, 17. 
By that time, defendant's mother, Afton McArthur, and his sister, Laura Kendall, came 
out of the house. R. 91: 9-10. They were screaming. R. 91: 10. Sherile ran into the house, 
got their cordless phone, walked out to the porch, and called 911. R. 91: 10, 18. As the 
phone was ringing, defendant came up and "slugged" her "full force" in the head. R. 91: 10, 
21-22. Then he ran. R. 91:10. 
After speaking with police, Afton and Laura went back inside the house, locked the 
doors, "locked the door between the basement and the kitchen, and just sat there with the 
lights on wondering what should we do." R. 91: 22-23. They were sure defendant would 
return. R. 91: 23. 
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He did. He was rattling the back door and saying, "Mom, I've got to get in and get my 
stuff. Mom, Mom, let me in." R. 91:23. He then started going to different doors trying to 
get in. R. 91 * 29. Afton and Laura "sat there just frozen, didn't know what to do " R 91 
23 Laura called the police. R. 91: 26. 
They heard a basement screen window being kicked in, and the door from the basement 
to the upstairs "break" open. R. 91: 23, 29 Carrying a container that Laura thought was an 
aspinn bottle, defendant went to the kitchen and picked up a 10-inch butcher knife and 
struggled with the bottle. R. 91: 24. In the living room, Laura was sitting in a chair and 
Afton was standing near the door. R. 91 • 24. Defendant came into the living room, walked 
to the door, and said, "Now, we're going to turn off the lights and pretend like we're not 
home, and Mom, you're going to go he down." R. 91: 24. As he said this, he had the knife 
raised, pointing away from him. R. 91: 24-25. 
Defendant then locked the door, turned off the porch light and television, and sat down 
near Laura, stood up, and sat down, "not saying, you know, T'm going to kill'—well, not 
saying much of anything, really, just kind of motioning around." R. 91. 25. He still had the 
knife R 91*25-26. 
At that point Laura stood up, pulled her mother by the sleeve, and tried to open the door 
Just as she opened the door, a police officer arrived. R. 91: 26. After the two women ran 
out, Officer Evans walked into the residence and saw defendant with a knife in his hand. R 
91 35. Evans drew his weapon and pointed it at defendant, who immediately sat down, 
dropped the knife, and "advised [Evans] to shoot him." R. 91: 35. Evans "didn't think that 
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was a wise idea," so he holstered his weapon and, observing that defendant was unwilling 
to comply with his orders, "sprayed him with pepper spray, which he reacted well to." R. 
91:35-37. 
While defendant was screaming, Officer Evans wrestled him to the ground and, after 
a struggle, handcuffed him. R. 91: 36. 
Defendant pleads guilty1 
At the change of plea hearing, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT:... Now insofar as the proposed resolution is concerned, Ms. 
Remal, have you discussed it with Mr. McArthur? 
MS. REMAL: I have. 
THE COURT: And you've gone over the statement of the defendant with 
him? 
MS. REMAL: I have. 
THE COURT: Are you persuaded he understands the effect and meaning 
of what he's about to do here? 
MS. REMAL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. McArthur, do you understand what's being proposed 
here? 
MR. MCARTHUR: I'm quite sure (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, you've talked to your lawyer about it, haven't you? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
2
 The transcript of the entire change of plea hearing is attached as addendum A. Judge 
J. Dennis Frederick presided at the change of plea hearing. 
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THE COURT: You've gone over that statement with your lawyer, haven't 
you? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that statement? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at ail about it? 
MR. MCARTHUR: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand, Mr. McArthur, by pleading guilty you're 
waiving certain constitutional rights that you otherwise have. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Including the right to b[e] tried by a jury of eight people, the 
right to require the State to prove their case against you beyond a reasonable doubt 
to the unanimous satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront and 
cross examine witnesses produced by the State against you, the right to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the 
stand and testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent during the 
trial, if you choose, and the right to appeal in the event a jury finds you guilty of 
the charges at a trial, as well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're 
found guilty if you are, all of which rights, as well as the others contained on 
that statement that we may not have discussed you're waiving by the entry 
of a guilty plea. Do you understand that? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: And knowing those waivers, do you want to proceed with this 
plea arrangement that the lawyers now have decided upon? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you're doing this freely and voluntarily? 
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MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir 
THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that statement at this time? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT. You may do so. 
(Defendant signs statement.) 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, Mr Mc Arthur has now signed 
the statement (inaudible) as well. 
THE COURT Very well, thank you. Indeed both Counsel and defendant 
have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you understand by having signed this 
statement you are admitted is [sic] true and correct the following facts and 
elements involved in two separate counts of threatening with or using a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about the 26th of 
October of last year through the 27th of October of last year, at the location of 309 
North, 1000 West in Salt Lake City, you, according to the offense, did not in self 
defense draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening manner or 
unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel. Those facts and elements are true 
and correct, are they not, sir? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT' This same conduct, which is constituted as a threat of a 
dangerous—use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred at the same location, 
309 North, 1000 West during the same time frame, the 26th/27th October on two 
different occasions. 
MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges. 
MS. REMAL: Right. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that there were two 
separate incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the same 
larger fight, nght? You're prepared to plead to two separate charges— 
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MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there— 
THE COURT: —involving the use of threatening use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and elements constitute 
two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for which you could be sentenced by 
this Court for a period of up to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined 
a sum of $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And knowing the potential penalty of one year and/or a $2500 
fine on each of the two, do you want to proceed with this arrangement these 
lawyers have worked out? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand further that if I determine to commit you to 
the jail, those terms in jail could well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
R. 92: 3-9 (emphasis added). 
In the plea colloquy, defendant signed a Statement of Defendant In Support of Guilty 
Plea and Certificate of Counsel. R. 35-41 (addendum B). In the Statement, defendant 
declares that he twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two 
persons: 
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas 
and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest): [handwritten:] On October 26,2002, at 309 North 1000 West, Salt Lake 
County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two 
persons. 
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R. 36 (emphasis added). The Statement also avers: "I know that I have a right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by 
pleading guilty (or no contest)." R. 37 (emphasis added). 
In addition, defense counsel signed a Certificate of Defense Attorney certifying that 
defendant had read and understood the Statement and that the factual basis of the crime was 
correct: 
I certify that I am the attorney for Raymond D. McArthur, the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to 
him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, 
are accurate and true. 
R. 40 (emphasis added). The court also signed the Statement. It found that the plea was 
"freely, knowingly, and voluntarily" made "[b]ased on the facts set forth in the foregoing 
Statement and the certification of the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral 
representations in court. . ." R. 42. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A defendant appealing from the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea cannot 
appeal plain errors allegedly committed in the plea hearing, only those committed in the 
motion hearing. For an appellate court to directly review the plea hearing would violate the 
prohibition against direct review of guilty pleas. Cases to the contrary are wrongly decided, 
and the issue is pending before the Utah Supreme Court. 
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2. Omitting speedy and impartial from the plea colloquy did not constitute obvious and 
prejudicial error where they are included in the statement of defendant, which he read, 
discussed, and understood. Defendant's claim that the trial court did not intend to rely on the 
plea affidavit to satisfy rule 11 requirements defies record evidence. 
In addition, his choice not to advance an ineffective assistance claim against his trial 
counsel demonstrates that any possible rule 11 errors were not obvious. Finally, defendant 
has failed to demonstrate, or even assert, that he pled guilty only because he believed his trial 
would be delayed and his jury biased. He therefore fails to satisfy the prejudice prong of the 
plain error test. Cases holding that prejudice is presumed are wrongly decided, and the issue 
is pending before the Utah Supreme Court. 
3. Defendant's and his counsel's certification that he "twice exhibited a knife in a 
threatening manner in the presence of two persons" is a sufficient factual basis to support 
defendant's guilty plea. In the plea affidavit, defendant certified that he committed two 
counts of threatening with a dangerous weapon. In the plea colloquy, the trial judge 
laboriously reiterated that defendant was pleading guilty to two separate crimes, that he 
would be sentenced separately for the crimes, and that his sentences could be run 
consecutively. The fact that evidence presented at the preliminary hearing may be 
ambiguous on this point is irrelevant: the factual basis for a guilty plea is not circumscribed 
by evidence presented in the preliminary hearing, especially in light of the assumption that 
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues. 




DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE ASSERTS NO PLAIN 
ERROR IN THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW, WHICH IS THE ONLY ORDER FROM WHICH HE HAS 
A RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Defendant's claim should be dismissed because he asserts error in a hearing from which 
he has no right of appeal. When a defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the appellate court has jurisdiction to correct plain errors committed 
in the motion hearing, but not plain errors committed in the plea hearing, from which 
defendant has no right of appeal. 
Utah law does not permit a defendant to directly attack a guilty plea on appeal. For over 
a decade, Utah procedure has required a defendant to file a motion to withdraw as a predicate 
to direct appellate review of the validity of a guilty plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 
3, 40 P.3d 630; State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Utah 1987); Summers v. Cook, 
759 P.2d 341, 343-45 (Utah App. 1988). This is so because the appellate court lacks 
jurisdiction to directly review the plea hearing, even for plain errors. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, Iff 
4, 5. Defendant must first file a timely motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at f 4. He may then 
appeal the order denying that motion. 
This arrangement is similar to the appeal of a bindover. An appellate court may not 
entertain an appeal from a magistrate's bindover order. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 
467 (Utah 1991). He must first move to quash the bindover in the district court (which may 
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in fact be presided over by the same "magistrate" who bound him over), then appeal from the 
denial of his motion to quash. Id at 468 n.9 
Reyes sought to circumvent these requirements. After pleading guilty, he filed a rule 
22(e) motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, the district court denied his motion and 
Reyes appealed. Id at f 1. On appeal, the supreme court noted, Reyes "has not addressed 
the court's denial of his motion.. " Id at f 2. Rather, he claimed plain error in the taking 
of his plea. Id at fflf 2, 3 In effect, he attempted to use his rule 22(e) motion as a Trojan 
horse to admit him to the appellate forum, where he sought direct plain error review of his 
plea heanng. His attempt failed, however, as the supreme court dismissed his appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction. Id atf 5. 
Defendant's approach here is not materially different. Although he filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, on appeal he "has not addressed the court's denial of his motion 
.." Id at f 2. He points to no plain error in the denial of his motion to withdraw, which is 
the only order from which he has a right of appeal, but seeks direct plain error review of the 
plea heanng. For this Court to directly review the plea heanng, even for plain error, would 
be to grant defendant precisely what Reyes and the cases upon which it relies forbid* direct 
review of the plea hearing. Plain error review is available in plea withdrawal cases, but it is 
limited to review of plain errors committed in connection with a distnct court's denial of the 
motion to withdraw. 
Accordingly, this Court should dismiss for lack of junsdiction.3 
3
 The State recognizes that this Court has engaged in plain error review of plea 
heanngs, but the practice is currently being challenged on certioran review See, e g, State 
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II. 
OMITTING SPEEDY AND IMPARTIAL FROM THE PLEA 
COLLOQUY DID NOT CONSTITUTE OBVIOUS AND PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHERE THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE STATEMENT OF 
DEFENDANT, WHICH HE READ, DISCUSSED, AND UNDERSTOOD 
Defendant's claims fail on the merits in any event. Defendant claims that "the trial 
court committed plain and obvious error when it failed to ascertain during the plea colloquy 
whether McArthur intended to waive his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury." Br. 
Aplt. at 15. This is so, he argues, because his reading of the record "supports that the trial 
court opted not to use the written statement/affidavit as a basis for fulfilling the requirements 
set forth at Rule 11(e)." Br. Aplt. at 11. 
Defendant is forced into this reading of the record by the fact that the Statement of 
Defendant, signed by both defendant and his counsel, states, "I know that I have a right to 
a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right 
by pleading guilty (or no contest)." R. 37. Consequently, this claim fails if the Statement 
was properly incorporated into the plea colloquy. It was. 
A. The trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(3) states that a court may not accept a guilty 
plea until the court has found that 
the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived. 
v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106, cert granted 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003). 
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The trial court bears the burden of ensuring compliance with this rule. State v. Visser, 
2000 UT 88, K 11,22 P.3d 1242 (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312, 1313 (Utah 
1987). This means "that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty 
plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly 
waived his or her constitutional rights." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). 
The supreme court has "described the court's duty in this regard as a duty of 'strict' 
compliance." Visser, 2000 UT 88 at f^ 11. "Strict compliance, however, does not mandate 
a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. (citing Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 996; 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991)). 
The objective of rule 11—ensuring that defendants know of their rights and thus 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty—should not be 
"overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id. 
Compliance with rule 11 "may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the 
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah 
R.Crim.P. 11(e)(8). The rule mentions only two methods of compliance: direct questioning 
or an affidavit. However, "the rule is stated permissively and thus does not prevent a court 
from taking into account other record factors in making its findings." Visser, 2000 UT 88 
f 12. "Strict compliance does not require a specific method of communicating the rights 
enumerated by rule 11." Id. at f^ 13. Indeed, "'strict compliance can be accomplished by 
multiple means,' including 'the contents of other documents such as the information, 
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presentence reports, exhibits, etc.,' as long as cno requirement of the rule is omitted and so 
long as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled/" Maguire, 830 P.2d at 
218; but see State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212 K 12, 73 P.3d 985 (stating that because neither 
the plea colloquy nor the affidavit referred to the preliminary hearing "we must limit 
ourselves to the plea colloquy, the affidavit, and the information"). Thus, the strict 
compliance test does not require "a time-consuming, mechanical oral recitation of each 
element mentioned in the rule." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218. 
Here, the record of the plea colloquy amply establishes that defendant "read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e)(8). 
First, defense counsel assured the judge, in response to his questions, that she had "gone over 
the statement of defendant with him" and was "persuaded he understands the effect and 
meaning of what he's about to do here." R. 92: 3-4. The judge then asked defendant whether 
he had "gone over that statement with [his] lawyer," and whether he understood it; defendant 
declared that he had. R. 92: 5-6. He had no questions about it. R. 92: 6. The judge then 
enumerated many of the rights defendant would be waiving by pleading guilty, adding "all 
of which rights, as well as the others contained on that statement that we may not have 
discussed you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea. Do you understand that?" R. 92: 7. 
Defendant answered, "Yes, sir, I do." R. 92: 7. 
The judge then asked defendant if he was "prepared to sign that statement at this time?" 
Id. Defendant was. "You may do so," the judge stated. Id. Defense counsel noted that 
defendant had signed the statement, to which the judge responded "Indeed, both Counsel and 
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defendant have signed the statement." Id. The judge then continued, "Mr. McArthur, you 
understand by having signed this statement you are admitting is true and correct the 
following facts and elements . . .?" Id. Defendant: "Yes, sir." R. 92: 8. After further 
discussion of the facts and elements of the case, the judge stated, "I will therefore accept your 
statement if it is executed freely and voluntarily, Mr. McArthur, which I assume it is?" R. 
92: 9. Defendant: "Yes, sir (inaudible)." Id. 
The judge thus discussed the affidavit at length with defendant and did not merely 
"assume that defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of 
the affidavit/' Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. 
Despite the foregoing exhaustive discussion of the plea affidavit, defendant surmises 
that "the trial court opted not to use the written statement/affidavit as a basis for fulfilling the 
requirements set forth at Rule 11(e)." Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant argues that the judge 
should have ascertained "what was set forth in the statement, what defendant reviewed with 
his attorney, and the extent to which defendant comprehended and acknowledged those 
provisions of the statement that he reviewed." Br. Aplt. at 12. "While such a procedure 
would have taken additional time, that is inconsequential." Id. Indeed, defendant would 
have the trial court "examine McArthur about constitutional rights identified in the statement 
. . . " Br. Aplt. at 18. 
On the contrary, such a meticulous exegesis of the affidavit is not required by law. 
Nothing in the rule or controlling precedent requires a trial court to orally canvas the entire 
affidavit with the defendant. Indeed, the purpose of the plea affidavit is to obviate such a 
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"time-consuming, mechanical oral recitation of each element mentioned in the rule." 
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218. The rule defendant advocates would render plea affidavits 
useless. 
The trial court here engaged in thorough discussion of the statement, ascertaining on 
the record that defendant "read, understood, and acknowledged" its contents. Utah R.Crim.P. 
11(e)(8). Nothing more is required. Because the Statement informed defendant that he was 
waiving a "speedy" trial before an "impartial" jury, and the Statement was fully incorporated 
into the plea colloquy, defendant's claim fails.4 
B. Any error was not obvious. 
The trial court committed no error. But even assuming arguendo that it did, the error 
was not obvious. Defendant proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard." State v. 
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). To establish plain error, an appellant must 
demonstrate: (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
4
 Defendant claims that "[t]he record of the plea proceedings does not indicate 
whether McArthur read the statement before signing it." Br. Aplt. at 9, n.2. On the contrary, 
defense counsel certified in writing "that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have 
read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands 
the meaning of its contents . . . " R. 40. 
In addition, at the time he pled guilty, defendant was 43 years old, read and 
understood English, and had completed two years of college. R. 39. He orally assured the 
court that he had gone over the Statement with counsel, understood it, and had no questions 
about it. R. 92: 5-6. Moreover, he asserts in the Statement itself that "I have read this 
statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt 
each statement in it as my own." R. 39. 
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This Court has long recognized that "if the error was plain to the court, it should also 
have been plain to trial counsel, who should have raised an appropriate objection. For this 
reason, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel typically is raised in conjunction with 
alleging plain error." Labrum 881 P.2d at 906. Indeed, "in any case where appellate counsel 
finds himself or herself needing to use the plain error doctrine to get an issue before the 
appellate court, a red flag should go up warning of the likelihood of a concomitant ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim . . ." Id. at 907. 
Here, defendant's trial counsel participated in the plea hearing, and filed and argued a 
motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea, all without raising this supposedly obvious 
claim. Yet defendant asserts no claim of ineffective assistance. That a defense attorney, 
whom defendant tacitly concedes was effective, participated in the plea hearing and moved 
to withdraw the plea without noticing the alleged error defendant now urges on appeal 
demonstrates that any error cannot have been obvious. 
C. Any error was not prejudicial. 
Similarly, even assuming arguendo that the trial court failed to ensure that defendant 
was aware of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, any error was not prejudicial. 
Defendant asserts that no prejudice showing is required once a rule 11(e) violation is 
proven. For this proposition he relies on State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106, 
cert, granted, 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003); State v. Kittle, 2002 UT App 134,47 P.3d 101, cert, 
granted, 59 P.3d 603 (2003); State v. Cornell, 2003 UT App 261, 74 P.3d 1171, petition for 
cert, filed (IS August 2003); and cases cited therein. These cases do assert that our courts 
21 
uwill presume harm under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform a defendant 
of his constitutional rights under rule 11." Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 9. 
However, the law is in reality not so clear. In State v. Kay, a prs-Gibbons case, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "If we were to hold that any violation of Rule 11 automatically voids 
the resultant plea, even when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after such a plea, to attack their convictions 
for purely tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after the 
fact." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., with one justice 
concurring, one justice concurring in part (including the quoted language) and concurring in 
the judgment, and two justices concurring in the judgment). "Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result [of overturning convictions without a showing of prejudice] would be to free a number 
of convicted persons for nothing more than technical errors in the acceptance of their 
voluntary guilty pleas." Id. at 1302. 
This is especially true in the plain error context. To establish plain error, an appellant 
must demonstrate that an error was harmful. Dunn, 850P.2dat 1208. While noncompliance 
with rule 11 may establish error and, in some cases, even obvious error, it does not 
necessarily establish prejudice. Indeed, this Court recognized a prejudice requirement in 
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, H 15, 5 P.3d 1222, where it failed "to see how the 
court's failure in this case to discuss the possibility that defendant may serve no time and 
incur no fine [as required by rule 11(e)(5)] would result in a harmful error." 
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Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of 
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, t 31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted). A 
defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must show "wa 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah) 
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59(1985)), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Thus, 
a defendant attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must demonstrate that but for the 
trial court's omissions, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to 
trial. 
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, the test 
for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional plain error 
analysis.D 
A similar rule is followed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
Rule 1 l's federal counterpart includes a subsection entitled "Harmless Error." Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the procedures required by this rule 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." This provision "rejects the 
extreme sanction of automatic reversal." Advisory Committee Note (1983 amendment). 
"The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tarnawiecfci by presuming 
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her right to a speedy trial before an 
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful." Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,1f 18. 
Tarnawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the trial court's violations 
of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty. Otherwise, omission of the words "speedy" and 
"impartial," like the failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her minimum possible sentence as 
required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless. 
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Thus, a rule 11 violation "warrants reversal only if it had a significant influence on 
appellant's decision to plead guilty." United States v. Vaughn, 7F.3d 1533, 1535 (10th Cir. 
1993) (citing United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1990)), cert, denied, 511 
U.S. 1036 (1994). Otherwise stated, the reviewing court will "'examine the facts and 
circumstances of the . . . case to see if the district court's flawed compliance with . . . Rule 
1 1 . . . may reasonably be viewed as having been a material factor affecting [defendant]'s 
decision to plead guilty.'" United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), in turn quoting 
United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). 
Although our rule 11 contains no harmless error provision, our plain error analysis does. 
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. The Tenth Circuit's formulation is thus a useful guide to the 
application of harmless error analysis in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 violation 
was harmful, a defendant must demonstrate that the errors significantly influenced or 
materially affected his decision to plead guilty. Otherwise stated, defendant must 
demonstrate prejudice by showing that his decision to plead guilty rested upon some 
misunderstanding that a proper rule 11 colloquy would have dispelled. 
Here, the court held a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Defendant did not then, nor has he since, asserted—much less proven—that he pled guilty 
in the belief that his trial would have been delayed and his jury biased. On the contrary, 
defendant seeks reversal "for nothing more than technical errors in the acceptance of [his] 
voluntary guilty plea[]." Kay, 111 P.2d at 1302. 
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III. 
DEFENDANT'S AND HIS COUNSELS CERTIFICATION THAT HE 
"TWICE EXHIBITED A KNIFE IN A THREATENING MANNER IN 
THE PRESENCE OF TWO PERSONS" IS A SUFFICIENT FACTU\L 
BASIS TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant claims that "the trial court committed plain error when it failed to explain the 
legal elements in relation to the facts for the guilty pleas" and "when it failed to ascertain a 
factual basis for each guilty plea." Br. Aplt. at 19 (capitalization and underlining omitted) 
This claim fails because it ignores the plea affidavit. 
A. Defendant understood the nature and elements of the offenses to which 
he pled guilty. 
Defendant first argues that "the trial court did not discuss the elements of both offenses 
in relation to the facts of the case" but "relied on one set of facts to support a guilty plea for 
both counts." Br. Aplt. at 19 (capitalization and underlining omitted). 
Rule 11(e)(4)(A) provides that the trial court may not accept a guilty plea until it has 
found that "the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered." "Failure to inform a defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is 
fatal to a guilty plea conviction." State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990). 
Where the plea colloquy incorporates the plea affidavit, which in turn incorporates the 
information, the court may, in assessing the defendant's understanding, rely on the plea 
colloquy, the affidavit, and the information. State v Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, f 12, 73 P 3d 
985, cert denied, 78 P.3d 987 (2003). 
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Defendant pled guilty to two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous weapon 
in a fight or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1999): 
Every person... who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more 
persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Defendant's brief speculates that he "entered two guilty pleas for a single incident 
through some misapprehension of the facts and the elements." Br. Aplt. at 31. This 
speculation of counsel lacks record support. Defendant himself has never claimed to have 
misunderstood anything. On the contrary, the record amply demonstrates that he understood 
the nature and elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty. In his plea affidavit, defendant 
recognizes the elements of the crime: 
Every person who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more 
persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel. 
R. 36. He also admits the facts of his crimes—that he "twice" exhibited a knife in a 
threatening manner in the presence of two persons: 
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas 
and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest): [handwritten:] On October 26,2002, at 309 North 1000 West, Salt Lake 
County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two 
persons. 
R. 36. Moreover, defense counsel certified that these statements were accurate and true: 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and 




Defendant now complains that he "did not have the opportunity to understand the nature 
of the elements in relation to this case, or to explain to the judge how his conduct constituted 
only one crime." Br. Aplt. at 29. On the contrary, the judge ensured that defendant was 
under no illusions as to the fact that he was pleading guilty to two separate counts: 
THE COURT: Very well, thank you. Indeed both Counsel and defendant 
have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you understand by having signed this 
statement you are admitted is [sic] true and correct the following facts and 
elements involved in two separate counts of threatening with or using a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about the 26th of 
October of last year through the 27th of October of last year, at the location of 309 
North, 1000 West in Salt Lake City, you, according to the offense, did not in self 
defense draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening manner or 
unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel. Those facts and elements are true 
and correct, are they not, sir? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as a threat of a 
dangerous—use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred at the same location, 
309 North, 1000 West during the same time frame, the 26th/27th October on two 
different occasions. 
MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges. 
MS. REMAL: Right. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that there were two 
separate incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the same 
larger fight, right? You're prepared to plead to two separate charges— 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there— 
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THE COURT: —involving the use of threatening use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and elements constitute 
two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for which you could be sentenced by 
this Court for a period of up to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined 
a sum of $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And knowing the potential penalty of one year and/or a $2500 
fine on each of the two, do you want to proceed with this arrangement these 
lawyers have worked out? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand furthermore that if I determine to commit you 
to the jail, those terms in jail could well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent? 
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
R. 92: 7-9 (emphasis added). The court went to extraordinary lengths to ensure, on the 
record, that defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to two separate crimes. 
B. There was a factual basis for the plea. 
Rule 11(e)(4)(B) provides that "the court may not accept the plea until the court has 
found" that "there is a factual basis for the plea." A factual basis is sufficient "if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction — " Id. The plain language 
of the rule requires a showing that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
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substantial risk of conviction only if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, as in State v Stilling, $56? 2d 666 (Utah App 1993) Unlike Stilling, defendant 
here admitted culpability R 92 8, 10-12 (addendum A) Hence, no showing of substantial 
risk of con\ iction was required. 
The relev ant question then is whether the record "establishes that the charged crime w as 
actually committed by the defendant." Again, the plea affidavit satisfies this requirement 
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas 
and prove the elements of the cnme(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest) [handwritten ] On October 26, 2002, at 309 North 1000 West, Salt Lake 
County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the presence of two 
persons 
R 36. Nothing more is required. Where an informed defendant, defense counsel, and the 
prosecutor all agree that defendant committed the charged crime twice, whether the 
preliminary heanng evidence is clear on this point is irrelevant The court may look to the 
preliminary heanng for a factual basis. See Willett v Barnes, 842 P 2d 860, 862-63 (Ltah 
1992) However, the factual basis for a guilty plea is not circumscnbed by evidence 
presented in the preliminary heanng, especially in light of "the assumption that the 
prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues " State v Clark, 2001 
UT 9, K 10, 20 P 3d 300 (quoting Evans v State, 963 P 2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998), in turn 
citing State v Pledger, 896 P 2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)). 
This case is unlike State v Thurman, 911 P 2d 371 (Utah 1996). There, the trial court 
was confused about the mental state required to commit the cnme of aggravated murder by 
bomb—indeed, one issue on appeal was what the proper mental state was After holding that 
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the correct mental state was "intentional or knowing," id. at 373, the supreme court examined 
the record for evidence that Thurman had admitted to this mental state. It first reviewed the 
plea affidavit. Although it referred to defendant's having acted "intentionally or knowingly/' 
in the next sentence Thurman stated, "It was not my intention to kill [the victim]." Id. at 374. 
Rather, he acknowledged having "created a grave risk of death..." Id. Not only did the oral 
colloquy fail to clarify this discrepancy, it suggested that the trial court itself was unclear on 
the requisite mental state. The supreme court concluded, "If the intentional or knowing 
element of the offense was not clear to the trial court, we can hardly assume that it was clear 
to Thurman at the time he entered his plea." Id. at 375. 
Here, neither the court nor the defendant exhibited any confusion over the elements of 
the offense, nor did defendant deny any element. Thurman is inapposite. 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) is similarly distinguishable. 
Breckenridge pled guilty to arson, an intentional crime. Id. at 443. Yet in the plea colloquy 
he expressly denied intentionally setting the fire and instead described starting the fire 
accidentally. Id. at 441. In his motion to withdraw his plea, he "testified that the fire was 
accidentally started." Id. at 442. 
None of these factors are present here. In the plea colloquy, defendant neither denied 
committing the crime twice, nor recounted a version of the facts inconsistent with his double 
plea. In the hearing on his motion to withdraw, he did not testify at all, much less testify that 
he committed only a single offense. Defense counsel claims—without record support—that 
defendant "entered two guilty pleas for a single incident through some misapprehension of 
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the facts and the elements," Br. Aplt. at 31. On the contrary, unlike Thurman and 
Breckenridge, defendant himself has never, in the plea colloquy, the motion to withdraw 
hearing, or any other hearing, claimed or manifested confusion about the nature and elements 
of his crimes. Accordingly, there is no reason to doubt his written statement, reinforced by 
the oral colloquy, that he committed two counts of threatening with a dangerous weapon. 
C. Any error was not obvious. 
The trial court committed no error. But even assuming arguendo it erred, the error w as 
not obvious, as demonstrated by the fact that defendant has chosen not to press a claim for 
ineffective assistance against trial counsel, despite the fact that she did not raise this claim 
in her motion to withdraw guilty plea. See point 2.B. above. In addition, no error that 
requires 21 pages to explain, see Br. Aplt. at 19-40, can be called obvious. 
D. Any error was not prejudicial. 
Similarly, assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, the error was not prejudicial, for 
reasons stated in point 2.C. above. 
Defendant's brief states, "If McArthur had been informed of the nature/elements of the 
separate offenses, and their relation to the facts of this case, he would not have pleaded guilty 
to two charges, particularly since his conduct supported only one offense." Br. Aplt. at 31 
(citation omitted). However, defendant himself, despite having moved to withdraw his plea 
in the district court, has neither asserted nor proven that, but for the alleged rule 11 
omissions, he would not have pled guilty. He thus seeks reversal "for nothing more than 
technical errors in the acceptance of [his] voluntary guilty plea[].,, Kay, 717 P.2d at 1302. 
31 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on January 10, 2003) 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Raymond Dean McArthur, 
4 case No. CR-02108. Ms. Remal, you are appearing in his behalf 
5 and Ms. Cook for the State. 
6 MS. REMAL: I am. 
7 THE COURT: Are you Raymond Dean McArthur? 
8 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, I am. 
9 THE COURT: Ms. Remal is your lawyer; is that correct? 
10 MR. MCARTHUR: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: This matter is on the calendar incident 
12 to a proposed resolution. What is it your are proposing here, 
13 Ms. Remal? 
14 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, what we're proposing is that 
15 Mr. McArthur will be pleading guilty to amended Count I and 
16 amended Count II. Both will be amended to reflect threatening 
17 with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel. That's 
18 pursuant to 76-10-506. Upon entry of those pleas, I anticipate 
19 that the State will move to dismiss the remaining counts 
20 against him in this matter. The State is also willing to agree 
21 to recommend a reduction in bail for Mr. McArthur once those 
22 pleas have been entered. 
23 THE COURT: The resulting charges are what? 
24 MS. REMAL: Threatening with or using dangerous weapon 






















































If I can approach, I have a copy of that. 
What is that, a misdemeanor or something? 
It's a class A misdemeanor, yes. 
Do you have an amended Information, Ms. 
(Inaudible). 
To your knowledge, then, Ms. Remal, after 
's, do you believe that the rest of the 
dismissed? 
Yes. 
And to your knowledge that constitutes the 
of the proposed resolution? 
MS. REMAL: Except that I understand Ms. Cook will 
in recommending to the Court that Mr. McArthur's bail 
be reduced to $10,000. I did file a formal motion. I hope it 





It is here. Now insofar as the proposed 












And you've gone over the statement of the 
I have. 
Are you persuaded he understands the 
-4-
1 effect and meaning of what he's about to do here? 
2 MS. REMAL: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Does that fairly state the proposed 
4 resolution, Ms. Cook, and if it does, will you state why? 
5 MS. COOK: It does (inaudible) your Honor. I would 
6 like to inform the Court that Count IV of the Information was 
7 not bound over (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: The class B, one of the class B's? 
9 (Ms. Cook stood over at end of table away from 
10 microphone, which made it impossible to get every 
11 word) 
12 MS. COOK: Interfering a peace officer making an 
13 arrest is not (inaudible). The prelim on this case a few weeks 
14 ago, and the evidence presented by my witnesses (inaudible) 
15 terribly strong in regards to (inaudible) amended Information 
16 (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: Have you discussed this with the victim? 
18 Are victims involved? 
19 MS. COOK: The victims have been informed and 
20 (inaudible). 
21 MS. REMAL: The victims are relatives of 
22 Mr. McArthur's, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Well, yeah, I see a domestic violence type 
24 of a case (inaudible). The question, though, it occurs to me 
25 that it was not until the preliminary hearing, you realized 
-5-
1 that that didn't have a third degree. 
2 MS. COOK: Your Honor (inaudible). 
3 THE COURT: Well, of course. 
4 MS. COOK: Okay (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: Exercising acute critical analysis 
6 yourself, you came to the conclusion that you didn't have it? 
7 MS. COOK: I think (inaudible) trial after hearing the 
8 witness testify. 
9 THE COURT: Well, was it the first time it occurred to 
10 you, at the preliminary? 
11 MS. COOK: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: You hadn't discussed this matter with your 
13 witnesses previously? 
14 MS. COOK: No (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: All right. You say that the victims are 
16 relieved to have this matter resolved. 
17 MS. COOK: They're satisfied (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: Mr. McArthur, do you understand what's 
19 being proposed here? 
20 MR. MCARTHUR: I'm quite sure (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: Well, you've talked to your lawyer about 
22 it, haven't you? 
23 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: You've gone over that statement with your 
25 lawyer, haven't you? 
-6-
1 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
2 THE COURT: Do you understand that statement? 
3 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all about it? 
5 MR. MCARTHUR: No, sir. 
6 THE COURT: Have any threats or promises been made to 
7 you or against you to get you to enter into these plea 
8 agreements other than what has been stated in open court? 
9 MR. MCARTHUR: No, sir. 
10 THE COURT: You're doing this freely and voluntarily? 
11 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: You understand, Mr. McArthur, by pleading 
13 guilty you're waiving certain constitutional rights that you 
14 otherwise have. 
15 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Including the right to by tried by a jury 
17 of eight people, the right to require the State to prove their 
18 case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to the unanimous 
19 satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront 
20 and cross examine witnesses produced by the State against you, 
21 the right to compel the attendance of witnesses in your own 
22 behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the stand and 
23 testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent 
24 during the trial, if you choose, and the right to appeal in the 
25 event a jury finds you guilty of the charges at a trial, as 
-7-
1 well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're found 
2 guilty if you are, all of which rights, as well as the others 
3 contained on that statement that we may not have discussed 
4 you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea. Do you 
5 understand that? 
6 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir, I do. 
7 THE COURT: And knowing those waivers, do you want to 
8 proceed with this plea arrangement that the lawyers now have 
9 decided upon? 
10 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: And you're doing this freely and 
12 voluntarily? 
13 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
14 THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that statement at 
15 this time? 
16 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: You may do so. 
18 (Defendant signs statement) 
19 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, Mr. 
20 McArthur has now signed the statement (inaudible) as well. 
21 THE COURT: Very well, thank you. Indeed both Counsel 
22 and defendant have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you 
23 understand by having signed this statement you are admitted is 
24 true and correct the following facts and elements involved in 
25 two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous 
-8-
1 weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about 
2 the 26th of October of last year through the 27th of October of 
3 last year, at the location of 309 North, 1000 West in Salt Lake 
4 County, you, according to the offense, did not in self defense 
5 draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening 
6 manner or unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel. 
7 Those facts and elements are true and correct, are they not, 
8 sir? 
9 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
10 THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as 
11 a threat of a dangerous — use of a dangerous weapon in a fight 
12 occurred at the same location, 309 North, 1000 West during the 
13 same timeframe, the 26th/27th October on two different 
14 occasions. 
15 MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges. 
17 MS. REMAL: Right. 
18 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that 
20 there were two separate incidences going on here, even though 
21 it may have been part of the same larger fight, right? You're 
22 prepared to plead to two separate charges— 
23 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there— 
24 THE COURT: —involving the use of threatening use of 
25 a dangerous weapon. 
-9-
1 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Those facts and elements as they relate to 
3 the use of dangerous weapons, specifically a knife, did occur 
4 during the time frame as indicated at the location stated; is 
5 that right, sir? 
6 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and 
8 elements constitute two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for 
9 which you could be sentenced by this Court for a period of up 
10 to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined a sum of 
11 $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not? 
12 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: And knowing the potential penalty of one 
14 year and/or a $2500 fine on each of the two, do you want to 
15 proceed with this arrangement these lawyers have worked out? 
16 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: You understand furthermore that if I 
18 determine to commit you to the jail, those terms in jail could 
19 well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent? 
20 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: I will therefore accept your statement if 
22 it is executed freely and voluntarily, Mr. McArthur, which I 
23 assume it is? 
24 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir (inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: Very well. Due to the charges as set 
-10-
1 forth in Count I of the Information has now been amended by 
2 interlineation to threat — threatening use of a dangerous 
3 weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. To Count I 
4 what is you plea? 
5 MR. MCARTHUR: Guilty. 
6 THE COURT: Count II, threatening use of a dangerous 
7 weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. To Count II 
8 what is you plea? 
9 MR. MCARTHUR: Guilty. 
10 THE COURT: I will accept your guilty pleas and 
11 dismiss the balance of this information. In the interest of 
12 justice you have the right now to be sentenced in no less than 
13 two nor more than 45 days from today's date. I'll schedule 
14 your matter for sentencing. 
15 COURT CLERK: February 21st. 
16 THE COURT: The 21st of February, which is Friday 
17 morning at 8:30. In addition, you have the right for good 
18 cause shown in no more than 30 days from the date of sentencing 
19 to move to set aside the guilty pleas entered here. 
20 Now Counsel, there is a motion to reduce bail, and 
21 you're prepared, I'm advised, Ms. Cook to concur with or at 
22 least not object to that motion? 
23 MS. COOK: That's correct. 
24 THE COURT: What kind of threat does this man pose to 
25 the victims involved? 
-11-
1 MS. COOK: Well, it was my understanding that he 
2 (inaudible) he would stay entirely away from them. I'm 
3 (inaudible). 
4 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I can respond to that, I 
5 think. As I stated in the motion, we expect that if his bail 
6 were reduced the Court certainly would order him to stay away 
7 from the individuals involved in this case, which is his 
8 mother, his sister and his daughter. 
9 He has another relative, a niece, that provided her 
10 name and address with whom he can reside. He still has 
11 employment available to him, but probably more important than 
12 anything is his intention to immediately seek treatment for 
13 alcohol abuse. At the time of this event, it's clear that Mr. 
14 McArthur had been consuming alcohol, and we understand that 
15 that has created a lot of problems for him in his life and 
16 certainly contributed greatly to his inability to control his 
17 behavior on this night. I don't know for sure, but I expect 
18 that if his family were consulted, they would probably indicate 
19 that use of alcohol makes a huge difference in his behavior. 
20 THE COURT: Well, since the State doesn't seem to be 
21 particularly concerned about the reduction and is willing to 
22 agree to it, I have no basis upon which to challenge the wisdom 
23 of the stipulation of reduced bail. I will therefore grant the 
24 request to reduce the bail. 
25 Now Mr. McArthur, as far as you and I are concerned, 
-12-
1 if you happen to make bail, you will absolutely have no contact 
2 whatever with any of the victims involved in this matter. Is 
3 that clear to you? 
4 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: And you will absolutely not engage in the 
6 use of any alcohol or illicit substances during this pre-
7 sentence period; do you understand? 
8 MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right. You follow those terras and 
10 keep in touch with your lawyer, but you be back here for 
11 sentencing on the date of the 21st of February at 8:30 in the 
12 event you're going to make bail. We'll provide you with a 
13 referral slip here that has the address of Adult Probation and 
14 Parole on it. If you make bail you must go immediately to the 
15 office of the AP&P, give them the information they need to do 
16 the pre-sentence report. Is that clear? 
17 MR. ARTHUR: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That will be the 
19 order. 
20 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, I have 
21 prepared a not very nice looking, but I think a document that 
22 would reflect (inaudible) order (inaudible). 
23 THE COURT: That's fine (maudibLe). 
24 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Ms. Cook is suggesting that we 
25 make sure that the trial date, which was set for the 21st and 
-13-
22nd is stricken. I'm assuming— 
THE COURT: Well/ of course. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. Om \Z-\C? ^ 
I, I^Hoo^.yj 0 ^ c-^itixA . hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and riehts: 
B. 
D. 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 







C • Thrf*46^',-v* U./rlAu'r I's 
C£ fti-acr^ 
f m t p l lS TSS1<-' Sirc(vn~yy 
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1 
c/' 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
^a^trPC-^S ^ ' ^ p ' n in ^\\ A^ M :t>\i fhrfJWirvi nrCUMNfr- J r 
I ' A W t l U u s n f l v S ^ f M> ;?ihn l i ^ h t - <?r ^ ^ r r ^ 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest): 
Cn center 2M Zcci <\h ?t>l 'V';~i*"K \CJLL IU>^- V^IH Ufe: 
^ ^ n \ V i J i n -The pr-tiSevx-ti Or- f u v . p t r v , n ^ 1 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
- » , \ . 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
Khaye not^have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waivcd-my-r4ght-to counsel. 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and vulaiiiariiy-fbrthcfottowtngreasons: 
'vcT- tnft\><jK\$c-3*1 
Wtmvjb waived my ris^Htfcoun^el, I certifv that 
I understand the namre^rKtelements of the chars^ s^ afid crimes 
5r no contest). Jkilso understand m^rifnts in this case ^nd^ 
consequence my guilty (or n^pmest) plea(s). 
statement and that 
I am ple^din^rguilt} 
cases and the 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is L i S7\ J ii» W 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) pleafs). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to. and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest). I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
3 
each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above-
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest), fknow that by-pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to-a-erime that~carries a-mandatory penaky^^itt^e^tibjeeting myself to serving 
-^mandatory penalty for that crime: I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. ^\*A 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as pan of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
4 "isr 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
DefeiidiiiK s Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of mv attornev. . , 
I am ^ 2 years of age. I have attended school through the ^  S grade. I can read 
and understand the English language, i& do not understand English, an interpfeterkas been-
"•provided to me.- I was not under the influence of an> drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
<> 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced 
and final judgment has been entered, I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I 
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Dated this ^ day of "Jft^v&A^,
 j 2 CC\ 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for fw-j op^rvi ft ftvrVrthir"". the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
BarNo. H L L _ 
6 Mo 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
|U.^>,-S^A 0 iVyfln^t ^ . defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance 
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. * 
PROS^UTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. ?8$\ 
7 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) pleaf s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this _^Kday of 
